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INTRODUCTION 
Landmark moments in patent law are rare.  Henry VI can claim 
the earliest of them in 1449 by granting letters patent for a new 
method of making stained glass.1  Parliament stepped in nearly 200 
years later, in 1624, when the Statute of Monopolies rendered all 
monopolies illegal save for those granted for a term of fourteen 
years for “working or making of any manner of new manufactures 
within this Realm to the true and first inventor” (a principle that 
 
*  Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London. 
**  Barrister, 11 South Square, London. 
 1 See History of Patents, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-
history.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
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remains in place to this day).2  Patents then were still granted by 
royal prerogative and bore a royal command that was the basis for 
adjudicating infringement.  Parliament did not turn its attention to 
infringement until the 1970s, when the United Kingdom joined the 
European Common Market and the European Patents Convention 
(the “EPC”), finally giving the UK system a wholly statutory 
basis.3 
The EPC’s primary purpose was to harmonize the principles of 
patentability among the contracting states.4  A secondary purpose 
was to create a central European Patent Office (the “EPO”).5  The 
EPO would have the power to grant patents that would be 
enforceable in their national territories—without any reference to 
the national office and, uniquely, without the supervision of any 
state court.6  To this extent, the EPC created a truly supranational 
patent system. 
The UK implemented the EPC through the Patents Act 1977 
(the “1977 Act”).7  The 1977 Act describes itself in its preamble as 
“a new law of patents.”8  Patent attorneys were immediately 
coming to terms with the EPC in their dealings with Munich.  But 
domestically, the UK courts and those acting before them carried 
on as if nothing material had changed, looking to the words of the 
1977 Act and paying little regard to the underlying EPC.  For the 
next decade they tended to turn to pre-1977 case law as an aid to 
interpretation, in preference to the developing case law of any 
other EPC member states or the EPO.  There were four related 
reasons for this.  First, patents granted under the new Act took time 
to find their way into the courts.  Secondly, the senior patent 
 
 2 Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); see also History of Patents in 
the Tudors and Stuarts Period, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-about/p-whatis/p-history/p-history-tudor.htm (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 3 See History of Patents in the Twentieth Century, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-about/p-whatis/p-history/p-history-20century.htm 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 4 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), 
art. 1, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter EPC]. 
 5 Id. art. 4, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 259. 
 6 See id. art.  2, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 259. 
 7 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 (U.K.). 
 8 Id. 
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lawyers of the day—the partners, QCs and judges—had all grown 
up under the old law.  Thirdly, much of the old law remained in 
force for patents granted before the new Act came into force.  
Fourthly, judges were simply not as used to European influence as 
they are today. 
In 1991 the status quo began to change as the first in a series of 
important patent cases under the 1977 Act came before the UK’s 
highest court, the House of Lords.  In each, the court had to 
grapple with the fundamental policy question at the heart of any 
difficult patent case: did the patentee’s contribution to public 
knowledge justify the monopoly it was claiming?  For over 500 
years the English courts had been used to resolving these questions 
independently.  In 1991 it became apparent they were no longer at 
liberty to do so.  Their duty was to interpret a new law of patents 
which applied not only in the UK but throughout the continent.  
While it was not yet certain what this new law meant, it was clear 
that the contracting states intended that its application be uniform.  
But, unable to supervise one another, how were the national courts 
to achieve this uniformity?  The practical answer, decided the 
House of Lords, was the EPO. 
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (formerly the 
House of Lords) chooses the cases it will hear, and only hears 
cases raising a point of law of general public importance.9  It has 
heard only a handful of cases over the last twenty years.  But those 
cases are the most important precedent in UK law and, with 
increasing clarity and insistence, as will be seen, they directed the 
lower courts to treat the EPO as the de facto final arbiter of the 
UK’s law of patents.  Whether this development was intended or 
even foreseen by the founding fathers of the EPC is unclear.  But 
with hindsight, it was probably inevitable. 
The role of practitioners has reflected (and perhaps even led) 
the internationalization of substantive law recognized in House of 
 
 9 The test is set out in paragraph 3.3.3 of the UK Supreme Court Practice direction 3: 
“an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by 
the Supreme Court at that time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the 
subject of judicial decision and may have already been reviewed on appeal.” Practice 
Direction (Applications for Permissions to Appeal) (Supreme Court), [2012], para. 3.3.3, 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/practice-direction-03.pdf.   
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Lords decisions.  The chinks in UK defences to mainland 
European and EPO case law that first showed up in the early 1990s 
have gradually been opened.  This process will continue 
inexorably, and with renewed vigour, as the final steps are taken to 
implementing the new European patent “package”—the Unitary 
Patent and Unified Patents Court. 
This paper uses seven key Supreme Court/House of Lords 
decisions to examine the growing influence of the EPO.10  It then 
considers how the new European patents package will fit into the 
delicate balance that has been achieved between national courts 
and the EPO, and its likely effect on the development of Europe’s 
law of patents.  Finally, it looks at the way in which practice for 
litigators has changed over the last two decades and what the 
coming decades may hold. 
I. 1991—ASAHI’S APPLICATION11 
The essential issue in Asahi was whether a patentee is entitled 
to a patent when his invention already forms part of the state of the 
art, but is not yet enabled.12 
In February 1985, Dainippon Pharmaceutical Company 
Limited applied for a European Patent claiming human tumour 
necrosis factor (or “HTNF”) (“Dainippon 2”).13  Dainippon 2 
claimed priority from a Japanese application filed in March 1984 
(“Dainippon 1”).14  In April 1985, Asahi filed an application for a 
UK patent claiming HTNF (“Asahi 2”).15  Asahi 2 claimed priority 
from a U.S. application filed in April 1984 (“Asahi 1”).16  It was 
common ground that Dainippon 1 disclosed no way of actually 
making HTNF, only its sequence, while the other three 
applications did disclose a way of making HTNF.17 
 
 10 In this paper we refer to the EPO as a convenient general shorthand, but more 
particularly we also refer to the decisions of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO.   
 11 Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 505. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 500, 531. 
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The examiner rejected Asahi 2 on the grounds that it lacked 
novelty over Dainippon 2, which was in turn entitled to priority 
from Dainippon 1.18  On appeal, the issue resolved into twin 
questions: (i) whether, for Dainippon 1 to confer priority on 
Dainippon 2, it was necessary for Dainippon 1 to constitute not 
merely a disclosure but an enabling disclosure of HTNF; and (ii) 
whether, to destroy the novelty of (or ‘anticipate’) Asahi 2, 
Dainippon 2 also had to constitute not merely a disclosure but an 
enabling disclosure of HTNF.19 
The old English law on the point was unclear.  In ICI/Pyridine 
Herbicides, however, the EPO had decided that (1) a claim to a 
chemical formula was not anticipated by the disclosure of that 
formula in the prior art unless that disclosure was also enabling 
and that (2) the test for whether a prior art disclosure was enabling 
was the same as the test for sufficiency.20  In Collaborative 
Research Inc/Preprorennin, the EPO held that the same test had to 
be satisfied for the purpose of claiming priority, i.e. the priority 
document had to be not merely a disclosure of the invention but an 
enabling disclosure.21 
In these cases the EPO had (standing back from the language 
of the EPC) recognized that, if a claimed invention could be 
anticipated by a mere disclosure which enabled nothing, there was 
a risk that genuine contributions to public knowledge in the form 
of enabling disclosures would not be rewarded.22  It followed 
inexorably that, if a non-enabling disclosure should not itself be 
novelty-destroying, the same disclosure should not be indirectly 
novelty-destroying through the priority system. 
The UK Patent Office, the Patents Court and the Court of 
Appeal all rejected the EPO’s logic and decided the case against 
Asahi on either old case law or by narrowly construing the 1977 
Act.23  When the case reached the House of Lords, Lord Oliver 
 
 18 Id. at 531. 
 19 See id. at 535. 
 20 Id. at 551 (citing Case T-206/83, ICI/Pyridine Herbicides, 1987 O.J. E.P.O. 5). 
 21 Id. at 512 (citing Case T-81/87, Collaborative Research/Preprorennin, 1990 O.J. 
E.P.O. 250). 
 22 See, e.g., id. at 513. 
 23 See id. at 486. 
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(who gave the leading speech) took a very different approach.  He 
accepted Asahi’s argument, holding that UK law had arrived 
independently at the conclusion that an enabling disclosure was 
required for anticipation, and therefore priority, observing: 
It should be added that the same approach as that 
adopted by Falconer J. in the Genentech case has 
been adopted in the [Pyrimidines and Preprorennin 
cases] . . . . These decisions, as was pointed out by 
Dillon L.J. in the instant case, are not binding in the 
United Kingdom, but they must carry considerable 
persuasive authority having regard to the provisions 
of section 130(7) [which declares certain sections of 
the 1977 Act to have same effect as equivalent 
provisions of the EPC] and the desirability of 
avoiding, so far as possible, divergent jurisprudence 
on the interpretation of broadly parallel 
provisions.24 
Asahi had been the first to teach the world how to obtain 
HTNF.25  It followed that it was entitled to a patent for this 
contribution.26  The anticipated objection based on Dainippon 1 
failed. 
It is hard to fault the EPO’s reasoning in the Pyrimidines and 
Preprorennin cases and it may therefore be unsurprising that Lord 
Oliver agreed with it.  But a precedent had now been set: although 
EPO decisions were not binding on the UK courts, the courts were 
nevertheless to treat those decisions as carrying “considerable 
persuasive authority.”27 
II. 1996—MERRELL DOW V. NORTON28 
In Merrell Dow the essential issue was how much detail about 
an invention a patentee needed to disclose to be entitled to a 
patent.29 
 
 24 Id. at 540. 
 25 See id. at 500. 
 26 See id. at 542. 
 27 Id. at 540. 
 28 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Norton & Co. Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 76 (H.L.). 
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In 1972, Merrell Dow obtained a patent for an antihistamine 
called terfenadine.30  Having patented terfenadine, it discovered 
that the active agent was in fact an acid metabolite of terfenadine 
formed in the liver.31  In 1980, Merrell Dow obtained a patent for 
the acid metabolite.32  When the terfenadine patent expired in 
1992, Merrell Dow claimed it could continue to prevent 
competitors selling terfenadine because to do so would be to 
knowingly provide a “means essential” for producing the acid 
metabolite.33  The question that came before the House of Lords 
was whether the claim to the acid metabolite was anticipated by 
either the original terfenadine specification (“anticipation by 
disclosure”) or the administration of terfenadine to volunteers in 
the clinical trials (“anticipation by use”).34 
Lord Hoffmann gave the leading judgment.  He started by 
noting that the 1977 Act requires section 2, which deals with 
anticipation, to be given the same effect as the corresponding 
provision of the EPC, and observed: 
It is therefore the duty of the United Kingdom 
courts to construe section 2 so that, so far as 
possible, it has the same effect as Article 54.  For 
this purpose, it must have regard to the decisions of 
the European Patent Office (“EPO”) on the 
construction of the EPC.  These decisions are not 
strictly binding upon courts in the United Kingdom 
but they are of great persuasive authority; first, 
because they are decisions of expert courts (the 
Boards of Appeal and Enlarged Board of Appeal of 
the EPO) involved daily in the administration of the 
EPC and secondly, because it would be highly 
undesirable for the provisions of the EPC to be 
construed differently in the EPO from the way they 
 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 80. 
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See id. at 81.  
 34 See id. at 82–84. 
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are interpreted in the national courts of a 
Contracting State.35 
Lord Hoffmann’s first contribution in the House of Lords to the 
UK’s law of patents was therefore to emphasize the EPO’s 
authority in construing the EPC and, by extension, the 1977 Act.  
His reasoning was quite explicit, as the emphasised passage 
demonstrates.  Consistency was the paramount concern.36 
Lord Hoffmann dealt with the “anticipation by use” argument 
first.37  Under the old law, there was no question that the 
administration of terfenadine to volunteers in the clinical trials, 
with the inevitable consequence of producing the acid metabolite 
in their livers, would have anticipated the acid metabolite patent.38  
It was clear that the acid metabolite had been produced before the 
priority of the patent,39 whether anyone was aware of this or not, 
and this would have been enough to make it part of the state of the 
art.40  It was argued that the new law was no different.41 
Lord Hoffmann disagreed: 
I think that this argument . . . dissolves completely 
when one looks, as one must, at Article 54 [the 
definition of novelty in the EPC].  This provision 
makes it clear that to be part of the state of the art, 
the invention must have been made available to the 
public.  An invention is a piece of information.  
Making matter available to the public within the 
meaning of section 2(2) therefore requires the 
communication of information.  The use of a 
product makes the invention part of the state of the 
art only so far as that use makes available the 
necessary information. 42 
 
 35 Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 
 36 See id. 
 37 See id. at 85. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. at 80. 
 40 See id. at 85. 
 41 See id. at 86. 
 42 Id. (second emphasis added).  It may also be observed that, having characterized an 
invention as “a piece of information,” it is hard to see how the “anticipation by use” 
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In other words, whereas under the old law “uninformative use” 
could anticipate a patent, under the new law it could not. 
Next he turned to the “anticipation by disclosure” argument.  It 
was not suggested that the terfenadine patent made any specific 
reference to the acid metabolite.43  All that was known at the time 
was that terfenadine created some kind of chemical reaction in the 
human body, which produced an antihistamine effect.  To this 
effect, the terfenadine specification contained the line: “a part of 
the chemical reaction in the human body produced by the ingestion 
of terfenadine and having an anti-histamine effect.”44 
It was argued that for all practical purposes this was an 
enabling disclosure of the acid metabolite.45  It was a description of 
the essential characteristic of the metabolite, namely its anti-
histamine effect, and of how to make it and therefore the fact that 
its precise chemical composition was not described was 
immaterial.46  Merrell Dow countered that only disclosure of a 
product by its chemical composition sufficed under the new law to 
make a product part of the state of the art.47 
Lord Hoffmann turned to EPO case law.  He noted that, in 
Bayer/Diastereomers, the EPO held that disclosure of a product 
described as the product of a specified process makes the product 
itself part of the state of the art whether or not its composition was 
also disclosed.48  It followed, he reasoned, that the disclosure of the 
chemical composition of a product is plainly not required to make 
a product part of the state of the art.49  Lord Hoffmann then went 
on to consider from first principles how much information about a 
product was required to make it part of the state of the art.50  He 
 
could have amounted to an enabling disclosure when the volunteers were not furnished 
with adequate information (i.e. the fact that they were taking terfenadine) to go away and 
continue to work the invention at will. 
 43 Id. at 87. 
 44 Id. at 90. 
 45 See id. at 88–89. 
 46 See id. at 86. 
 47 See id. at 89. 
 48 Id. at 89 (citing Case T-12/81, Diastereomers, 1982 O.J. E.P.O. 296).  This is a so-
called “product by process claim,” a theme to which we shall return. 
 49 See id. at 89–90. 
 50 See id. at 89. 
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concluded that an invention forms “part of the state of the art if the 
information which has been disclosed enables the public to know 
the product under a description sufficient to work the invention.”51  
The terfenadine patent enabled the public to know the acid 
metabolite as part of the chemical reaction produced by ingesting 
terfenadine.52  This was enough.  He pithily summed up his 
reasoning by observing that, in much the same way, quinine had 
been part of the state of the art long before its chemical 
composition was discovered by western scientists.53 
At its core, Merrell Dow’s argument was that it deserved its 
extended monopoly because it had revealed that terfenadine 
worked because of the acid metabolite.54  Merrell Dow 
acknowledged a striking consequence of this argument: if a 
competitor had discovered the acid metabolite and patented it, that 
competitor would have been entitled to prevent Merrell Dow 
selling terfenadine.55  Instinctively, one feels this cannot be correct.  
But why not?  The answer is simple.  Merrell Dow had already 
taught the public that taking terfenadine produced an antihistamine 
effect.  The further discovery that this effect is actually produced 
by the acid metabolite, while of academic interest, gave the public 
no additional relevant knowledge.56 
The fundamental question was therefore how much 
information about an invention is sufficient to make that invention 
part of the state of the art?57  The EPO’s approach to product by 
process claims provided the answer.58  If the public has sufficient 
information to obtain a product and know its practical application, 
that is enough.  A patentee need not teach any more than this, and a 
patentee who does teach more than this is not entitled to a second 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. at 90. 
 53 Id. at 91 (“The Amazonian Indian who treats himself with powdered bark for fever 
is using quinine, even if he thinks the reason why the treatment is effective is that the tree 
is favoured by the Gods.”). 
 54 See id. at 80–81. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. at 84–86. 
 58 Id. at 87. 
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patent for the same product.  As in Asahi, the touchstone was the 
practical value of the disclosure to the public.59 
Again, it is hard to fault the EPO’s reasoning in 
Bayer/Diastereomers.60  No doubt this prompted Lord Hoffmann 
not only to draw on that reasoning, but also to emphasize the 
persuasive authority of the EPO’s decisions, thereby confirming 
the Asahi precedent. 
III. 1997—BIOGEN V. MEDEVA61 
In Biogen, the essential question was not whether Biogen was 
entitled to a monopoly at all, but how broad that monopoly should 
be.62 
Biogen, Inc. was set up in 1978 to exploit recombinant DNA 
technology in the production of useful proteins.63  One initial target 
was antigens of the Hepatitis B virus.64  Professor Sir Kenneth 
Murray, a molecular biologist and one of Biogen’s founders, split 
the then unsequenced HBV genome into large fragments, spliced 
these into plasmid loops and introduced this recombinant DNA 
into bacteria.65  His hope, but certainly not his expectation, was 
that one of the fragments would contain a suitable HBV antigen 
gene and that this would be “expressed” (i.e. translated into HBV 
antigen protein) by the bacteria.66 
The state of the art being what it was at the time, there was 
much reason to doubt that Professor Murray’s approach would 
work, but it did.67  Biogen immediately filed for patent protection, 
first in the UK (Biogen 1), and later at the EPO (Biogen 2).68  
Biogen 2, asserting priority from Biogen 1, claimed any 
 
 59 See id.; see also Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.). 
 60 Case T-12/81, Diasteromers, 1982 O.J. EPO 296. 
 61 Biogen v. Medeva, [1997] R.P.C. 1 (H.L.). 
 62 See id. at 4.  
 63 See id. at 33. 
 64 See id. (stating that these could be used to test for HBV infection and to develop a 
vaccine). 
 65 See id. at 36–40. 
 66 See id. at 39. 
 67 See id. at 36–39. 
 68 Id. at 33. 
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recombinant DNA molecule capable of expressing HBV 
antigens.69 
In due course Medeva found an entirely new way of producing 
a recombinant HBV antigen.  Biogen sued.  In the House of Lords, 
as in Asahi,70 the issue resolved into whether Biogen 1 enabled 
Biogen 2.71  There was no question that the disclosure of Biogen 1 
enabled the skilled addressee to make a recombinant DNA 
molecule capable of expressing the HBV antigen.72  But equally 
there was no suggestion that it enabled the skilled person to make 
all such molecules.73 
At first instance, the Patents Court held that an invention was 
sufficiently enabled if the skilled man could make one embodiment 
falling within the claim.74  Its reasoning was based on its 
interpretation of the EPO’s decision in Genentech/Polypeptide 
Expression.75 
The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Patents Court on 
the question of sufficiency, pointing to the Exxon/Fuel oils case.76  
In that case, the EPO had held that an invention must be enabled 
across the full range of the claim, and whether or not this was so 
was a question of fact in each case.77 
The House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal.78  Lord 
Hoffmann explained that the EPO’s decision in Genentech I had 
been misinterpreted by the Patents Court: 
[T]he Board in Genentech I/Polypeptide Expression 
was doing no more than apply a principle of patent 
law which has long been established in the United 
Kingdom, namely, that the specification must 
 
 69 Id. at 40. 
 70 Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.). 
 71 See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 46. 
 72 See id. at 48. 
 73 See id.  
 74 See id. at 49–50. 
 75 See id. (citing Case T-292/85, Genentech/Polypeptide expression, 1989 O.J. EPO 
275). 
 76 See id. at 53–54 (citing Case T-409/91, Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149). 
 77 See Case T-409/91, Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149, 156. 
 78 See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 53. 
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enable the invention to be performed to the full 
extent of the monopoly claimed.  If the invention 
discloses a principle capable of general application, 
the claims may be in correspondingly general terms.  
The patentee need not show that he has proved its 
application in every individual instance.  On the 
other hand, if the claims include a number of 
discrete methods or products, the patentee must 
enable the invention to be performed in respect of 
each of them.79 
He went on to consider whether or not Biogen 1 disclosed a 
principle of general application, which entitled it to the broad 
monopoly claimed.80  In a now famous passage, he held that it did 
not: 
I return therefore to consider the technical 
contribution to the art which Professor Murray 
made in 1978 and disclosed in Biogen 1.  As it 
seems to me, it consisted in showing that despite the 
uncertainties which then existed . . . known 
recombinant techniques could nevertheless be used 
to make the antigens in a prokaryotic host cell. . . .  
Does this contribution justify a claim to a monopoly 
of any recombinant method of making the antigens?  
In my view it does not.  The claimed invention is 
too broad.  Its excessive breadth is due, not to the 
inability of the teaching to produce all the promised 
results, but to the fact that the same results could be 
produced by different means. . . . The metaphor 
used by one of the witnesses was that before the 
genome had been sequenced everyone was working 
in the dark.  Professor Murray invented a way of 
working with the genome in the dark.  But he did 
not switch on the light and once the light was on his 
method was no longer needed.81 
 
 79 Id. at 48. 
 80 Id. at 51–52. 
 81 Id.  
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The fundamental question in Biogen was familiar: what 
contribution had Biogen made to the art and how broad a 
monopoly should it receive for that contribution?  As we have 
seen, the EPO—contrary to the Patents Court’s view—had held 
that a broad claim had to be enabled across its full breadth, and that 
whether that was so was a question of fact in each case.82  Lord 
Hoffmann went further by reducing the EPO’s approach to a rule: 
where the patentee had invented a “principle of general 
application”—i.e. a principle which could be expected to work in 
the same way whatever the precise details of the components or 
reagents used—he was entitled to a broad claim.83  Lord Hoffman 
found that Professor Murray had invented no such principle, and so 
was not entitled to its broad claim.84 
While Biogen showed the House of Lords seeking to follow 
EPO case law, the consequence turned out to be a divergence 
between UK and EPO case law.  As we will explore below, the 
House of Lords does not usually revisit the same ground in rapid 
succession, but the difficulties created by Biogen brought the 
sufficiency issue back before  the Supreme Court in 2009. 
IV.   2005—KIRIN-AMGEN V. HOECHST MARION ROUSSEL LTD.85 
The formal issue in Kirin-Amgen was construction.86  Did 
Amgen’s claim catch a rival product or did it not?  Again, 
however, the fundamental question was whether Amgen’s 
contribution to the art entitled it to the broad monopoly claimed.87 
By 1983, it was well known that the human kidney protein 
Erythropoietin (“EPO”) was responsible for stimulating the 
production of red blood cells in bone marrow.88  EPO’s potential as 
a treatment for anaemia in patients with kidney disease was widely 
 
 82 See T-409/91, Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149, 156. 
 83 See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 51. 
 84 See id.  
 85 Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 
9. 
 86 See id. at 184–87 [27–45]. 
 87 See id. at 171 [H9]. 
 88 See id. at 180 [8]. 
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recognized.  Small amounts of the protein had been painstakingly 
isolated and purified from human urine, but obtaining enough for 
therapeutic use by this method was out of the question.89 
Amgen was the first to sequence the gene for EPO.90  Equipped 
with this sequence, it was able to isolate the gene from a human 
donor cell and introduce it into a Chinese hamster cell in culture (a 
“CHO cell”), which could then be used to produce large amounts 
of EPO.91  Amgen filed a patent application claiming EPO 
produced by the expression of recombinant DNA in a “host cell.” 
A competitor, TKT, discovered a new way of using 
recombinant DNA to produce EPO.  Instead of extracting the gene 
from a human cell and putting it into an animal cell, TKT used 
recombinant DNA techniques to modify the EPO gene within a 
human cell in culture so that it expressed large amounts of EPO.92  
TKT called this technique “gene activation” and its product “GA-
EPO.”93  Amgen sued.  The key question was whether Amgen’s 
claim covered GA-EPO even though this had in fact been produced 
in a modified human cell as opposed to a “host cell.”94 
Section 125 of the 1977 Patent Act95 directed the Courts to 
construe patent claims in accordance with Article 69 of the EPC 
and the “Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69” (the 
“Protocol”).  Article 69 provides: 
The extent of the protection conferred by a 
European patent or a European patent application 
shall be determined by the claims.  Nevertheless, 
the description and drawings shall be used to 
interpret the claims.96 
The Protocol then explains how Article 69 itself should be 
interpreted: 
 
 89 Id. at 179 [5]. 
 90 Id. at 179–80 [6]. 
 91 Id. at 180 [9]. 
 92 Id. at 180–81 [10]. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. at 179 [2]. 
 95 The Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 125 (Eng.). 
 96 EPC, supra note 4, art. 69. 
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Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that 
the extent of the protection conferred by a European 
patent is to be understood as that defined by the 
strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the 
claims, the description and drawings being 
employed only for the purpose of resolving an 
ambiguity found in the claims.  Nor should it be 
taken to mean that the claims serve only as a 
guideline and that the actual protection conferred 
may extend to what, from a consideration of the 
description and drawings by a person skilled in the 
art, the patent proprietor has contemplated.  On the 
contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position 
between these extremes which combines a fair 
protection for the patent proprietor with a 
reasonable degree of legal certainty for third 
parties.97 
The Protocol represented perhaps the most striking 
compromise between the signatories to the EPC, particularly the 
UK and Germany.  The UK and Germany were generally taken to 
represent the extreme ends of construction, with their respective 
approaches caricatured as a strictly literal approach to claim 
construction on the one hand and a very loose approach to claim 
construction on the other.98  The purpose of the Protocol was to 
make clear that, under the new law, the courts of the contracting 
states were to strike a balance between these two extremes.99 
Following the entry into force of the 1977 Act, the Patents 
Court decided that the Protocol simply reflected the traditional UK 
 
 97 European Patent Convention, Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69, art. 1, 
Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/e/ 
ma2a.html. 
 98 See, e.g., Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London—Local 
Internationalism: How Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom 
with Europe, the United States, and the Rest of the World, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV. 
31, 40–43 (2005).  
 99 See Kirin-Amgen, [2005] R.P.C. at 183–84 [23–26]; Auchincloss v. Agricultural and 
Veterinary Supplies, [1997] R.P.C. 649, 663. 
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approach to construing patent claims.100  As we shall see, this was 
to prove controversial.  Some knowledge of the controversy as it 
unfolded is necessary to understand Kirin-Amgen. 
The old approach to claim construction had been settled in 
Catnic v. Hill & Smith.101  The correct approach, as explained by 
Lord Diplock, was “purposive construction:” 
A patent specification should be given a purposive 
construction rather than a purely literal one derived 
from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal 
analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by 
their training to indulge.  The question in each case 
is: whether persons with practical knowledge and 
experience of the kind of work in which the 
invention was intended to be used, would 
understand that strict compliance with a particular 
descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was 
intended by the patentee to be an essential 
requirement of the invention so that any variant 
would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even 
though it could have no material effect upon the 
way the invention worked. . . . [The question] is to 
be answered in the negative only when it would be 
apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a 
particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim 
cannot have been intended by a patentee, who was 
also skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants 
which, to the knowledge of both him and the 
readers to whom the patent was addressed, could 
have no material effect upon the way in which the 
invention worked.102 
The Catnic approach was applied under the 1977 Act in 
Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd.103  The case 
 
 100 See, e.g., A.C. Edwards Ltd. v. Acme Signs & Displays Ltd., [1992] R.P.C. 131, 
136; Southco Inc. v. Dzus Fastener Europe Ltd., [1992] R.P.C. 299, 312; Improver Corp. 
v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181, 190.  
 101 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 242–43 (H.L.). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Improver, [1990] F.S.R. 181, 188–90. 
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concerned a hair removal device called a depilator.104  The 
functional part of Improver’s patented original device consisted of 
a rotating, curved spring.105  Hairs entered into the space between 
the coils of the spring on the convex side, and were gripped and 
removed as the rotating coils were pressed together on the concave 
side.106  Remington liked the basic idea.  It noted that Improver’s 
claim specified the use of a “helical spring” and proceeded to 
design around the claim, replacing the helical spring with a 
rotating, curved rubber rod scored with transverse slits.107  At trial, 
the key question Judge Hoffmann108 had to answer was whether, 
on its true construction, Improver’s claim caught Remington’s 
product.109  He distilled Lord Diplock’s guidance on variants in 
Catnic into three questions, the Improver or “Protocol” questions, 
as follows: 
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the 
way the invention works?  If yes, the variant is 
outside the claim.  If no— 
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material 
effect) have been obvious at the date of publication 
of the patent to a reader skilled in the art.  If no, the 
variant is outside the claim.  If yes— 
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless 
have understood from the language of the claim that 
the patentee intended that strict compliance with the 
primary meaning was an essential requirement of 
the invention.  If yes, the variant is outside the 
claim.110 
To the first two questions Hoffmann J. answered “no” and 
“yes” respectively, leaving only the third.  As to this, Improver 
relied strongly on this passage in the specification: 
 
 104 See id. at 184 (“Depilation means the removal of hair by the root, as opposed to 
shaving which leaves the root behind.”). 
 105 See id. at 184–85. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. at 187.  
 108 Lord Hoffmann was elevated to the Court of Appeal in 1992 and to the House of 
Lords in 1995. 
 109 See Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at 188–89. 
 110 See id. at 189. 
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It will be evident to those skilled in the art . . . that 
the present invention may be embodied in other 
specific forms without departing from the essential 
attributes thereof . . . and all variations which come 
within the meaning and range of equivalency of the 
claims are therefore intended to be embraced 
therein.111 
The specification’s language notwithstanding, Judge Hoffmann 
felt unable to give the term “helical spring” a wide, generic 
construction and thus held the patent not infringed.112  Helical 
spring meant helical spring.  He noted that his opinion differed 
from German courts’ result, despite the fact that both English and 
German courts had purported to apply Article 69 and the Protocol, 
but at the same time Hoffman J. did not fail to note that he 
considered the German construction the result of an insufficiently 
literal approach to construction.113 
As noted in PLG v. Ardon, the German Oberlandesgericht, or 
higher regional court, retaliated by criticizing Hoffmann J.’s 
Improver opinion for applying a UK pre-1977 approach to 
construction.114  The Ardon court went on to comment on the 
inconsistent results: 
[It is] unnecessary to consider whether Lord 
Diplock’s purposive construction was an accurate if 
proleptic application of the Protocol.  It clearly went 
at least part of the way towards the European 
position by stretching the claims to cover minor 
variants which obviously have no material effect on 
the way the invention works.  It does not, however, 
appear to us to be useful to consider whether it went 
further and may be taken as indicating the proper 
approach to construction under the Protocol.  Such 
an exercise merely engenders a sterile debate on the 
precise meaning of Lord Diplock’s words, a matter 
 
 111 Id. at 186. 
 112 Id. at 197. 
 113 See id. at 197–98. 
 114 See PLG Research Ltd. v. Ardon Int’l Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 287, 307–09 (citing 
Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc. [1991] IIC 833 (Ger.)). 
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which should now be left to legal historians.  Lord 
Diplock was expounding the common law to the 
construction of a patent.  This has been replaced by 
the approach laid down by the Protocol.  If the two 
approaches are the same, reference to Lord 
Diplock’s formulation is unnecessary, while if they 
are different it is dangerous.  In future, it is to be 
hoped that attention will be concentrated on the 
requirements of the Protocol and the developing 
European jurisprudence and not on those of the 
common law before 1977.115 
The Court of Appeal’s attempt to consign Catnic to legal 
history was met with rebellion.  In AssiDoman Multipack v. The 
Mead Corporation, the specialist Patents Court Judge Aldous  
retorted: 
In that part of their judgment, the Court of Appeal 
are, I believe, making it clear that their observation 
on the applicability of “purposive” construction 
under the 1977 Act are obiter.  For myself, I would 
be loathe to discard 14 years of case law unless it is 
certain that the “purposive” construction is not the 
correct approach under the Act.  If it be right that 
“purposive” construction should be left to legal 
historians, then it is necessary to put forward 
another means of navigation to enable the court to 
steer the correct course between Scylla and 
Charybdis.  The middle ground referred to in the 
Protocol is not clearly defined and every court 
within the Community has adopted a method of 
interpretation which it believes to be consistent with 
the Protocol. . . . There is no European position 
except that set out in the Protocol.116 
Then, in Beloit Technologies Inc. v. Valmet Paper Machinery 
Inc. (No. 2), the other senior Patents Court Judge, Jacob J., 
 
 115 Ardon, [1995] R.P.C. at 309. 
 116 AssiDoman Multipack Ltd. v. Mead Corp., [1995] R.P.C. 321, 337. 
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agreed.117  When the question came back before the Court of 
Appeal, the newly elevated Aldous L.J. affirmed his view in 
AssiDoman.118  “Purposive construction” was to remain the 
English approach to claims construction, however it was done 
elsewhere in Europe. 
In Kirin-Amgen, therefore, Catnic remained the law.  The judge 
at first instance had initially reasoned that the skilled person would 
not understand Amgen’s claim as covering GA-EPO.119  GA-EPO 
was not made in a “host cell.”  However, that judge then went on 
to ask the Improver questions and decided that the claim did cover 
GA-EPO after all.120 
In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann reviewed the authorities 
on construction and confirmed that “purposive construction” was 
indeed compliant with the Protocol: 
The Catnic principle of construction is, therefore, in 
my opinion, precisely in accordance with the 
Protocol.  It is intended to give the patentee the full 
extent, but not more than the full extent, of the 
monopoly which a reasonable person skilled in the 
art, reading the claims in context, would think he 
was intending to claim.121 
Turning to the controversy caused by his decision in the 
Improver case, Lord Hoffman observed that ultimately there was 
only one “compulsory” question: what would the skilled person, 
reading the claims in context, think the patentee was intending to 
claim?122  Sometimes the Improver questions would help, 
sometimes they would not.  But they were certainly not mandatory 
in all cases involving allegedly immaterial variants.123  Lord 
Hoffman held that the judge’s initial construction of the claim was 
correct and that he had simply confused matters by attempting to 
 
 117 Beloit Techs. Inc. v. Valmet Paper Mach. Inc., [1995] R.P.C. 705, 719–21. 
 118 See Kaster v. Rizla Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 585, 594 (“I have not been persuaded . . . 
that the views I expressed in Assi[D]oman were wrong.”). 
 119 See Kirin-Amgen, [2005] R.P.C. at 192 [58]. 
 120 See id. at 193–95 [63–75]. 
 121 Id. at 189 [48]. 
 122 Id. at 194 [69]. 
 123 See id. 
C08_WATTSALKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  11:35 AM 
592 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:571 
apply the Protocol questions as well.124  There is a hint of 
compromise in the judgment.  Purposive construction was the 
correct approach, but any attempt to define it further was liable to 
lead to difficulties.  Lord Hoffman used the opportunity to further 
align the approach between European Courts, stating that: 
German judges do not ask whether a variant “works 
in the same way” but whether it solves the problem 
underlying the invention by means which have the 
same technical effect.  That may be a better way of 
putting the question because it avoids the ambiguity 
illustrated by American Home Products Corporation 
v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd [2001] RPC 8 
over whether “works in the same way” involves an 
assumption that it works at all.125 
Lord Hoffmann also held the various claims at issue bad either 
for lack of novelty or for claims breadth insufficiency.  In his 
judgment’s final passage he observed: 
Standing back from the detail, it is clear that Amgen 
have got themselves into difficulties because, 
having invented a perfectly good and ground-
breaking process for making EPO and its analogues, 
they were determined to try to patent the protein 
itself, notwithstanding that, even when isolated, it 
was not new.126 
Elsewhere in the judgment, when addressing novelty, Lord 
Hoffmann emphasized again the increasingly recognized 
supremacy of EPO case law, and indeed he based his decision on 
that principle: 
I think it is important that the United Kingdom 
should apply the same law as the EPO and the other 
Member States when deciding what counts as new 
for the purposes of the EPC.  It is true that this 
means a change in a practice which has existed for 
many years.  But the difference is unlikely to be of 
 
 124 See id. 
 125 Id. at 195 [75]. 
 126 Id. at 206 [132]. 
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great practical importance because a patentee can 
rely instead on the process claim and art. 64(2).  It 
would be most unfortunate if we were to uphold the 
validity of a patent which would on identical facts 
have been revoked in opposition proceedings in the 
EPO.  I would therefore allow this part of the 
appeal.127 
Again, the fundamental problem was that Amgen had tried to 
claim more than was justified by their contribution to public 
knowledge.  And again, the House of Lords took the opportunity to 
emphasize the importance of alignment between European Courts 
and the supremacy of EPO case law. 
V. 2008—CONOR MEDSYSTEMS V. ANGIOTECH PHARMACEUTICALS128 
At issue in Angiotech was what exactly the patentee had 
established at the time of filing about the usefulness and 
obviousness of its claimed invention.129  The courts at first instance 
had found that the patentee had in fact disclosed something useful, 
but without an investigative basis for that disclosure.130 
By the early 1990s, the value of stents for treating constricted 
arteries was well known.  However, the presence of a stent often 
prompted an exaggerated healing response, causing the artery to 
become constricted again.131  This process was known as 
“restenosis.”132  In 1993, a group of Dutch scientists published a 
two-part article133  that reviewed the research that had been done 
on restenosis, and the two prevailing theories for how it might 
 
 127 Id. at 200 [101] (citation omitted). 
 128 Conor Medsystems Inc. v. Angiotech Pharm. Inc., [2008] UKHL 49, [2008] R.P.C. 
28. 
 129 Angiotech, [2008] R.P.C. at 722–23. 
 130 See id. at 725–26. 
 131 See id. at 721. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. (citing Jean-Paul R. Herrman et al., Pharmacological Approaches to the 
Prevention of Restenosis Following Angioplasty: The Search for the Holy Grail? (Part I), 
46 DRUGS 18 (1993); Jean-Paul R. Herrman et al., Pharmacological Approaches to the 
Prevention of Restenosis Following Angioplasty: The Search for the Holy Grail? (Part 
II), 46 DRUGS 249 (1993)). 
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eventually be tackled.134  The first theory likened the phenomenon 
to cancer and suggested the use of anti-proliferatives.135  The 
second likened the process to clotting, and suggested the use of 
anti-thromobotics.136  In a summary dealing with future 
possibilities, the authors said: 
[D]espite 15 years of clinical experience and 
research in the field of restenosis prevention, this 
has not yet resulted in the revelation of unequivocal 
beneficial effects of any particular drug. . . .  
Whether there is a feasible monotherapy, whether 
we have to focus on a drug combination, or whether 
we are only searching for the “Holy Grail” remains 
to be answered.137 
In short, then, in 1993, nobody knew precisely how to solve the 
problem of restenosis—although there was no shortage of ideas. 
Back in 1991, however, it had occurred to a medical student 
called William Hunter that one way of dealing with restenosis 
might be to seek to inhibit the growth of capillary blood vessels to 
the affected area.138  He tested various drugs for anti-angiogenic 
properties by an established, if somewhat crude, assay involving 
chick embryos (the “CAM” assay).139  Among the drugs tested in 
February 1993 was taxol, a recently discovered anti-proliferative 
which was much in the news as a possible cancer treatment.140  On 
the CAM assay, taxol was an extraordinarily effective inhibitor of 
angiogenesis, “even in minute concentrations.”141 
Angiotech immediately filed for a patent.142  The relevant 
claim was for a stent coated with taxol for treating a “narrowing of 
 
 134 See Angiotech, [2009] R.P.C. at 721. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. (quoting Jean-Paul R. Herrman et al., Pharmacological Approaches to the 
Prevention of Restenosis Following Angioplasty: The Search for the Holy Grail? (Part 
II), 46 DRUGS 249 (1993)). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 722. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See id. 
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a body passageway” and for “treating or preventing restenosis.”143  
The application offered no proof that such a stent would work.144  
In fact, all Angiotech had done was to decide to investigate anti-
angiogenesis as a possible way of dealing with restenosis, 
identifying taxol as a promising anti-angiogenic.145 
In 2005 Conor Medsystems applied to revoke the patent on the 
grounds of obviousness.146  Conor argued that, because 
Angiotech’s patent taught no more than that a taxol eluting stent 
was worth a try in the battle against restenosis, all Conor had to 
show was that it was obvious to try a taxol-coated stent.147  This, 
Conor said, was obvious because it was obvious to try anti-
proliferatives and taxol was an anti-proliferative much in vogue.148  
Angiotech countered that Conor’s approach was wrong in 
principle.  What Conor had to show, it argued, was that it was 
obvious to use a taxol-coated stent to treat restenosis.149  This, said 
Angiotech, was not obvious because there was no reason to think 
that taxol, out of all the other anti-proliferatives that might have 
been chosen, would actually work.150 
The Patents Court and the Court of Appeal sided with Conor 
and held the patent invalid for obviousness.151  In the Netherlands, 
however, the same obviousness attack had failed.152  By the time 
the matter came before the House of Lords, Angiotech and Conor 
had settled their dispute.153  The House of Lords took the case in an 
evident desire to resolve the tension between the results in the UK 
and Holland.154  Having settled, Conor did not argue the case in the 
 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 723. 
 145 See id. at 722.  
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 723 (quoting statement of Simon Thorley, Q.C.). 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. (“That seemed a fairly straightforward issue and Angiotech no doubt 
prepared for trial clutching the Holy Grail paper as the best possible evidence that there 
was at the time no obvious solution to restenosis.”). 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id. at 720. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See id. 
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House of Lords; Angiotech’s opponent was the Comptroller of 
Patents.155 
The Comptroller’s case was based on a line of EPO authority 
in which the EPO had interpreted the EPC as enabling it to reject 
entirely speculative claims on the basis that they involved no 
inventive step.156  The EPO took the view that, because the 
patentee had not actually solved an objective technical problem, 
the inventive step question simply did not arise.157  It addressed the 
point at which a claim would become purely speculative in Johns 
Hopkins University School of Medicine Case/Growth 
Differentiation factor-9: 
The definition of an invention as being a 
contribution to the art, i.e. as solving a technical 
problem and not merely putting forward one, 
requires that it is at least made plausible by the 
disclosure in the application that its teaching solves 
indeed the problem it purports to solve.158 
Lord Hoffmann took this “plausibility” requirement as the 
guiding principle in the Angiotech case: 
These cases are in my opinion far from the facts of 
this case.  The specification did claim that a taxol 
coated stent would prevent restenosis and Conor did 
not suggest that this claim was not plausible.  That 
would have been inconsistent with the evidence of 
its experts that taxol was just the thing to try.  It is 
therefore not surprising that implausibility was 
neither pleaded nor argued.  The same was true of 
the proceedings in the Netherlands. . . . [T]here is in 
my opinion no reason as a matter of principle why, 
if a specification passes the threshold test of 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 727 (“There is also a line of authority in the EPO in which claims to broad 
classes of chemical compounds alleged to have some common technical effect have been 
rejected under [article] 56 (obviousness) when there was nothing to show they would all 
have that technical effect.”). 
 157 See id. at 727–28. 
 158 Case T-1329/04, Factor-9/Johns Hopkins, ¶ 11, available at 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t041329eu1.pdf.  
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disclosing enough to make the invention plausible, 
the question of obviousness should be subject to a 
different test according to the amount of evidence 
which the patentee presents to justify a conclusion 
that his patent will work.159 
Accordingly, like the Dutch, the House of Lords held the patent 
valid.160  The formal dispute had centered on whether the inventive 
step question was to be considered by reference to the material 
claimed, or to some combination of the claims and the 
description.161  Underlying this formal question was the same 
fundamental issue: had Angiotech actually given enough to justify 
its claimed monopoly?  The experienced judges of the Patents 
Court and the Court of Appeal did not consider the CAM assay 
results enough.162  The Dutch disagreed.163  Rightly or wrongly, 
the House of Lords sided with the Dutch, citing the EPO’s 
“plausibility” test as the relevant threshold.164  It held that the 
CAM assay results were enough to make the invention “plausible,” 
and that this was enough to justify Angiotech’s monopoly.165 
It was far from clear that the Dutch and the EPO had got it 
right.  In Johns Hopkins, the EPO was surely correct to say that a 
claim will be obvious if the specification does not even make it 
plausible that the claimed invention actually works.  But, all other 
things being equal, is the converse necessarily true?  The lower 
courts took the view that the question of obviousness was, like 
claims breadth sufficiency, ultimately to be decided by reference to 
an inventor’s contribution to the art—to substance rather than 
form.166  In the interest of maintaining consistency with both 
another major European nation and the EPO, the House of Lords 
decided that form took precedence so long as the invention was 
merely “plausible.”  This was a major victory for patentees.  But 
 
 159 Angiotech, [2009] R.P.C. at 728. 
 160 See id. at 726. 
 161 See id. at 723. 
 162 See id. at 729. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See id. at 728. 
 165 See id. at 729–30. 
 166 Id. at 732 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, concurring). 
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given the assessment that the case would have gone the other way 
in the absence of a desire to be seen to be following EPO case law, 
the decision served as the clearest indicator to date of the deference 
that the House of Lords was now paying to EPO case law. 
VI.  2009—GENERICS (UK) LTD. V. LUNDBECK167 
Lundbeck returned to the question posed in Biogen: whether 
the patentee had invented a “principle of general application” so as 
to justify a broad claim.  The outcome was both surprising and 
controversial. 
In 1989, citalopram entered the market for antidepressants.168  
It had been discovered and patented by Lundbeck.169  The process 
for synthesising citalopram produced a racemate, i.e., an 
undifferentiated mixture of two alternative three-dimensional 
forms or “enantiomers” of the same molecule.170  Nobody knew 
how to “resolve” the racemate, i.e., how to produce each of the 
enantiomers in its pure form,171 and nobody knew whether 
citalopram’s pharmacological effect was attributable to one or the 
other of the enantiomers or to both.172 
In 1987, Lundbeck succeeded in resolving the racemate.173  It 
discovered that the anti-depressant effect was caused entirely by 
the (+)-enantiomer, escitalopram.174  Lundbeck filed a patent for 
escitalopram.175  Claim 1 of the patent was to escitalopram defined 
by its chemical formula.176  Claim 6 of the patent was to 
Lundbeck’s method of producing escitalopram.177 
 
 167 Generics (UK) Ltd. v. H Lundbeck A/S, [2009] UKHL 12, [2009] R.P.C. 13. 
 168 [2009] R.P.C. at 428 [59]. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 414 [2]. 
 171 Id. at 428–29 [61]. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 429 [62]. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 414 [5]. 
 177 Id. 
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In 2005, Generics applied to revoke the escitalopram patent.178  
It argued that all Lundbeck had done was to repatent the active 
ingredient in citalopram; that the way Lundbeck had succeeded in 
resolving the racemate was obvious; and that Lundbeck’s real 
contribution to the art was to find one way of resolving the 
racemate, yet it sought to claim escitalopram made by any method 
per Biogen and Kirin-Amgen.179 
The judge at first instance rejected the novelty and obviousness 
attacks, but accepted that the patent was insufficient by virtue of 
claims that were too broad.180  That left Lundbeck with only a 
claim to its specific method of producing escitalopram.  Lundbeck 
appealed.  Exceptionally, Lord Hoffmann descended from the 
House of Lords to sit in the Court of Appeal, giving him the 
opportunity to revisit and explain the principle he had laid down in 
Biogen.181 
First, Lord Hoffmann rejected the novelty attack on the 
strength of EPO case law on the disclosure (or, rather, non-
disclosure) of enantiomers by racemates,182 and the obviousness 
attack on the facts.183  On sufficiency, he said this: 
S.60(1) of the Act makes it clear that a claim may 
be either to a product or a process.  In the case of a 
product claim, performing the invention for the 
purposes of s.72(1)(c) means making or otherwise 
obtaining the product.  In the case of a process 
claim, it means working the process.  A product 
claim is therefore sufficiently enabled if the 
specification discloses how to make it.  There is 
nothing to say that it must disclose more than one 
way.  The judge founded his decision entirely upon 
the decision of the House of Lords in Biogen Inc v. 
Medeva plc [1997] R.P.C. 1, which he subjected to 
a careful and detailed analysis.  I shall try, with 
 
 178 Id. at 429 [65]. 
 179 See Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Lundbeck, [2007] R.P.C. 32, 737 [4]. 
 180 See id. at 795 [266]. 
 181 See Lundbeck v. Generics (UK) Ltd., [2008] R.P.C. 19. 
 182 Id. at 443 [9]. 
 183 Id. at 446 [25]. 
C08_WATTSALKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  11:35 AM 
600 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:571 
suitable diffidence to explain why I do not think 
that case yields so broad a principle. 184 
Lord Hoffmann explained that Biogen was decided as it was 
because it involved not a product claim, but a “product-by-
process” claim.185  By defining the product by the way in which it 
had been made, namely by recombinant DNA technology, the 
claim had inherently claimed a class of products, because the word 
“recombinant” encompassed a class of processes.186  Pure product 
claims, he said, were different: 
[The judge] treated the relevant “technical 
contribution to the art” as being the inventive step, 
namely a way of making the enantiomer.  That, I 
respectfully consider, was a mistake.  When a 
product claim satisfies the requirements of s.1 of the 
1977 Act, the technical contribution to the art is the 
product and not the process by which it was made, 
even if that process was the only inventive step. 
 
That proposition is in my opinion established by a 
number of decisions in the European Patent Office.  
In T0595/90 Kawasaki Steel Corporation [1994] 
O.J. E.P.O. 695 claim 1 was to a product, namely a 
certain description of high grade steel sheeting.  In 
opposition proceedings, the Board of Appeal found 
that the claimed product “only has properties which 
were fully predicted and envisaged, i.e. the matter is 
obvious as such.”  However, the Board went on, 
“this desideratum was not yet actually achieved” 
and was “hardly realisable on a commercial scale.”  
If the patentee had found a non-obvious way of 
making the product, he was entitled to a product 
 
 184 Id. at 447 [30–31] (citation omitted). 
 185 See id.at 447 [33].  Lord Hoffman had disapproved of such claims in Kirin-Amgen. 
See Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 
9, 198 [90] (H.L.). 
 186 See Lundbeck, [2008] R.P.C. 19 at 448 [34]. 
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claim, with the full monopoly of the product which 
that conferred.187 
He went on to describe a number of other EPO authorities to 
the same effect and concluded: 
Biogen should therefore not be read as casting any 
doubt upon the proposition that an inventor who 
finds a way to make a new product is entitled to 
make a product claim, even if its properties could 
have been fully specified in advance and the 
desirability of making it was obvious.188 
Lundbeck’s product claim was therefore valid.189  Lord 
Hoffmann’s judgment was upheld on the further appeal to the 
House of Lords.190 
It is far from clear that the EPO got it right in Kawasaki Steel 
and the other product claim cases.  As Lord Hoffmann observed, it 
had not even occurred to anyone that sufficiency should even be 
argued in these cases.191  But this does not necessarily mean that it 
would not have been a good point, as it was in Biogen.  The 
tension between the result in the two cases is obvious.  Lord 
Hoffmann himself recognised as much.192  He suggested that, 
ultimately, Biogen had been unfortunate because it could not make 
a pure product claim.193  A DNA molecule which expressed HBV 
antigens was known to exist in nature, had been isolated in the 
form of the HBV genome and was therefore old.194  This reasoning 
is unconvincing.  What Professor Murray had made was clearly not 
the same as the HBV genome.  Assuming, then, that Biogen could 
have found a way to describe Professor Murray’s DNA molecule 
that did not use the word “recombinant,” it appears to follow that 
Biogen would have been entitled to their broad monopoly after all.  
 
 187 Id. at 448 [36–37]. 
 188 Id. at 449 [40].  
 189 Id. at 450 [47]. 
 190 See Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Lundbeck, [2009] UKHL 12, [2009] R.P.C. 13. 
 191 See [2009] R.P.C. at 446–50 [26–47]. 
 192 See id. at 449 [42]. 
 193 See id. 
 194 See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 26. 
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Yet its actual contribution to the art would have remained the 
same. 
Like Angiotech, then, Lundbeck was a triumph of form over 
substance designed to ensure consistency with the EPO.  “Great 
persuasive authority” meant exactly what it said. 
VII.  2011—HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES V. ELI LILLY195 
In Human Genome Sciences v. Eli Lilly the issue was very 
similar to the issue in Angiotech save that the attack was industrial 
applicability rather than obviousness. 
In 1996, Human Genome Sciences discovered a DNA 
sequence which coded for a member of the “TNF ligand 
superfamily” of proteins.196  TNF ligands are proteins which act as 
intercellular mediators in inflammation and other immune 
responses.197  HGS called its new member of the family 
“neutrokine-α.”198  It had discovered neutrokine-α not by any 
laboratory technique, but by mining publicly available databases of 
human DNA sequence information using information technology 
techniques called “bioinformatics.”199 
HGS applied to patent neutrokine-α.200  The description 
essentially disclosed the sequence and structure of neutrokine-α, its 
tissue distribution and a prediction of its properties based on the 
general properties of the TNF ligand superfamily.201  However, 
none of this was backed up with any specific information about 
neutrokine-α derived from any in vivo or in vitro experiments.202  It 
 
 195 Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] UKSC 51, [2012] R.P.C. 
6. 
 196 Id., [2012] R.P.C. at 109 [3].  The reader will recall that TNF itself was the subject 
of the applications in the Asahi case. See Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] 
R.P.C. 485 (H.L.). 
 197 Eli Lilly, [2012] R.P.C. at 110 [7]. 
 198 Id. at 109 [3]. 
 199 Id. at 112 [17]. 
 200 Id. at 109 [4]. 
 201 Id. at 110 [7–8]. 
 202 Id.  
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couldn’t be—the experiments had not yet been done and the 
specific information was not yet available.203 
Eli Lilly applied to revoke the patent, arguing that HGS’s 
“invention” was so speculative it was not capable of industrial 
application.204  Lilly was successful before the examiners at the 
EPO and at first instance in the UK.205  However, by the time the 
case came before the Court of Appeal in the UK, HGS had 
successfully appealed to the Technical Board of Appeal of the 
EPO.206  In summary, the Board held that the skilled person would 
have appreciated “in the light of common general knowledge of the 
TNF ligand superfamily and its properties” that neutrokine-α 
would be active in directing the proliferation, differentiation and 
migration of T-cells and that this was enough to justify a 
monopoly.207 
The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that it need not give 
deference to the TBA on what it considered findings of fact and 
that the judge had been correct in law and fact.208  It was an overt 
rejection of an EPO decision.  In 2011, the matter came on before 
the newly formed Supreme Court.209  Giving the leading judgment, 
Lord Neuberger observed: 
In a number of recent decisions of the House of 
Lords, attention has been drawn to “the importance 
of UK patent law aligning itself, so far as possible, 
with the jurisprudence of the EPO (and especially 
decisions of its Enlarged Boards of Appeal)”, to 
quote Lord Walker in Generics (UK) Ltd v. H 
Lundbeck A/S, [2009] R.P.C. 13, para.35.  It is 
encouraging that the same approach is being 
adopted in Germany by the Bundesgerichtshof—see 
 
 203 Id.  
 204 Id. at 114 [29]. 
 205 Id.  
 206 Id. at 114 [30].  
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 115 [32]. 
 209 The House of Lords ended its judicial function on 30 July 2009; the Supreme Court 
opened on 1 October 2009. 
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Case Xa ZR 130/07 (10 September 2009), para. 
33.210 
He went on to point out that, while it was permissible for 
national courts to differ from each other and the EPO where the 
evidence in the various proceedings was different, and that there 
was “room for dialogue” between the national courts and the EPO, 
where the EPO had adopted a consistent approach to an issue in a 
number of decisions, the national courts should follow that 
approach.211  This, he held, was the position with the EPO’s 
approach to industrial applicability.212 
In view of the differing results between the result in the EPO 
on the one hand, and the result at first instance and in the Court of 
Appeal on the other, it was perhaps inevitable that the Supreme 
Court would hold that the courts below had failed properly to 
apply the principles developed by the EPO.213  Lord Neuberger 
interpreted the EPO jurisprudence as meaning that a “plausible” or 
“reasonably credible” claimed use for an invention, or an 
“educated guess,” would suffice to satisfy the requirement of 
industrial applicability.214  He held that the judge and the Court of 
Appeal had erred in applying a more stringent test, and finally 
observed: 
Just as it would be undesirable to let someone have 
a monopoly over a particular biological molecule 
too early, because it risks closing down 
competition, so it would be wrong to set the hurdle 
for patentability too high . . . . Quite where the line 
should be drawn in the light of commercial reality 
and the public interest can no doubt be a matter of 
different opinions and debate.215 
As in Angiotech, the UK Patents Court and the Court of Appeal 
had decided that the validity of a patent had to be decided by 
 
 210 Eli Lilly, [2012] R.P.C. at 127 [84]. 
 211 Id. at 128 [87]. 
 212 Id. at 136–38 [129–40].  See generally EPC, supra note 4, art. 57. 
 213 See Eli Lilly, [2012] R.P.C. at 138 [140]. 
 214 Id. at 132 [107]. 
 215 Id. at 136–37 [130]. 
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reference to the patentee’s contribution to the art.216  The lower 
courts took the view that what HGS had contributed was simply 
not enough; there was nothing in the specification of genuine use 
to the public, merely a protein sequence and some speculation on 
what it might do based on publicly available knowledge.217  Again 
they were overruled by the highest appellate court in the interests 
of consistency with the EPO, which decided that the disclosure 
from HGS, which had satisfied the EPO, was good enough here 
too.218  This was a case, like Angiotech and Lundbeck before it, 
where the House of Lords had clear scope to differ from the EPO 
but declined that opportunity.  The status of the EPO as de facto 
final arbiter of the UK’s law of patents was now firmly entrenched. 
VIII.  THE RISKS OF ALIGNMENT WITH THE EPO 
As the above review demonstrates, the House of Lords has 
followed the EPO in every significant case since 1991 not because 
the Lords necessarily agreed but because, faced with a choice, they 
placed consistency above all else.  Was this an abdication of the 
court’s responsibility to interpret the law as they saw it? 
Early on (in Asahi, Merrell Dow, Biogen, and Kirin Amgen) the 
answer to this question is probably not.  In these cases there was 
every reason to agree with the EPO.  Later on (in Lundbeck, 
Angiotech, and HGS) there was good reason to think the EPO had 
got it wrong.  In HGS it was argued with some force that, being an 
office rather than a court, the EPO’s case law had developed 
primarily in ex parte cases, and was too generous to patentees.   
The House of Lords rejected this argument, and accepted a 
decisive shift of the balance in favour of the patentee without 
challenge in the interests of maintaining uniformity.  In principle, 
the House of Lords (and now the Supreme Court) made judgments 
only on questions of law, and its course has aligned UK law with 
the law as it is developed and applied by the EPO.  In practice, 
however, the decisions of the EPO and the Courts are made in 
specific factual contexts and it is unrealistic to attempt to divorce 
 
 216 Id. at 103 [H7]. 
 217 Id. at 115 [31–34]. 
 218 Id. at 134–35 [120]. 
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the legal question from its factual context.  It is interesting to 
speculate whether, if the first instance judge had applied the legal 
test as eventually determined by the Supreme Court, he would also 
have made findings of fact that meant the outcome was no 
different.  The legal tests leave room for judgment, as Lord 
Neuberger expressly recognized in his judgment in HGS.  
Adherence to the law determined by the EPO does not imply that 
courts reach the same determination.  While EPO decisions have 
great persuasive authority on law, the same is not true in relation to 
findings of fact.219  It is debatable whether the appellate system as 
operated in the UK, in which decisions are not remitted for further 
determination, guards sufficiently against the danger that following 
legal determinations will drag in factual findings by the back door. 
IX.  THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT 
The steps to complete the European patent package are 
gathering pace.  At the time of writing, the EU has put in place the 
two regulations underpinning the Unitary Patent.220  The 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court was signed on 19 February 
2013221 and the Rules of Procedure are in their fourteenth draft.222  
 
 219 See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Johnson & Johnson, [2011] E.C.C. 10, 191 [62] (“[The 
TBA and other courts] did not have the benefit of the intensive probing of the facts and 
expert evidence afforded by cross-examination which is provided by English procedure.  
Sometimes that procedure is wasteful, but not in this case.”).  A parallel can perhaps be 
drawn with the decisions of the CJEU which constitutionally is not able to make findings 
of fact. See Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed (No. 2), [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 13, 388 [9], 
393 [27], rev’d, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 25, 810 [25] (upholding the lower court on these 
points). 
 220 Council Regulation 1257/2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of 
the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361); Council Regulation 
1260/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 361) (for the latter, with regard to the applicable translation 
arrangements). 
 221 Bulgaria is expected to sign once internal procedues are completed.  Spain and 
Poland did not sign but the agreement remains open for signature. See Press Release, 
Council of the European Union, Signing of the Unified Patent Court Agreement  
(Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/ 
pressdata/en/intm/135593.pdf.    
 222 At the time of writing, the Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of Procedure 
of the Unified Patent Court, fourteenth draft, is available at 
http://www.upc.documents.eu.com/PDFs/2013-01-31_Rules_of_Procedure_Draft_14_ 
(15829021_1).pdf.  
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There is still much to be done: the Agreement must be ratified by 
thirteen Member States, the Rules finalised, fee levels set, judges 
appointed and trained, local and regional divisions established, and 
budgets, buildings and IT systems put in place.  Consequential 
changes are needed in the European Patent Convention, the 
“Brussels” Regulation 44/2001 on civil jurisdiction and the SPC 
Regulations 469/2009 and 1610/96.  There is no doubt that that is a 
substantial list, but there appears to be the political will to see it 
through. 
Under a Unified Patent Court, the relationship between the 
Unified Court and the EPO may become analogous to the 
relationship between a national courts and its national office.  The 
Court will have power under the Rules to supervise the 
administrative tasks of the EPO in relation to unitary patents.223  
Over time the Unified Court may also come to regard itself as the 
senior forum for determining substantive questions of law and 
validity.  It might be argued that, in view of the recent history at 
least in the UK, this is a welcome development.  How long it takes 
the new Court to develop the confidence to review and depart from 
existing case law of the EPO remains to be seen. 
A great deal of debate in the legislative history of the Unified 
Patents Court focussed on the role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.  Practitioners were greatly concerned at the 
effects on substantive patent law of the delays and inexperience in 
patent matters that that would incur.  Concern focussed in 
particular of Articles 6–8 of the draft for Regulation 1257/2012, 
and was largely assuaged when those Articles were replaced, 
following a compromise meeting of legislators on 19 November 
2012.224 
 
 223 See id., Rules 85–96.  
 224 See UK Parliament House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 3 European 
Unitary Patent, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 
cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxi/86xxi06.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); European Parliament 
Legislative Resolution of 11 December 2012 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the 
Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, COM (2011) 0215 (Dec. 11, 2012), 
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16304.en12.pdf.  
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Just as the EPO is open to accusations that, as a patent 
awarding office, it develops the law in a direction that is unduly 
friendly to patentees, one can anticipate that legal developments in 
the new courts will be examined for policy influence.  From the 
Unified Patent Court, staffed with specialist patents judges, it 
would be difficult to anticipate any particular policy direction 
beyond the efficient operation of justice over the patents system.  
The same would not have held true had the policy influence been 
directed from the Court of Justice of the European Union.  This is a 
first important step towards establishing the credibility of the new 
court. 
It remains unclear when the effects of the new patent package 
will really be felt.  It is up to patentees225 to choose whether they 
want a patent with unitary effect or to continue with the present 
system.  It is also up to patentees to choose whether to opt their 
patents out of the system—an opt-out will be open for seven years 
after the Agreement enters into force.226  Thus, even when the 
system is up and running, it can only be expected to succeed if 
patentees believe it will be an improvement over the existing 
system. 
It is difficult to overestimate the cynicism and even hostility 
that greeted the proposals for the system, in the UK and elsewhere.  
In one particularly scathing examination of the position, published 
in May 2012, the UK parliament’s cross-party European Scrutiny 
Committee concluded: 
Although the theory of a unitary patent and unitary 
patent court in Europe has long been thought 
desirable, the practice has long been elusive.  The 
latest attempt appears, regrettably, to be a further 
example of this.  Moreover, some of the criticisms 
raised by witnesses result from traits that are so 
ingrained in the operation of the EU that a 
legitimate question arises whether an effective 
 
 225 Council Regulation 1257/2012, recital 5.  
 226 Council Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 16351/12, art. 83, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16351.en12.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 
2013). 
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unitary patent can ever be achieved within the 
confines of the EU’s internal legal order. 
 
We conclude overall that the draft agreement on the 
Unified Patent Court is likely to hinder, rather than 
help, the enforcement of patents within the 
European Union.  This will particularly be so for 
SMEs, the main intended beneficiaries.  Given our 
concerns, it is vital that the UK Government adopts 
a strong position reflecting the concerns of 
practitioners in final negotiations, as well as calling 
for the Central Division to be in London in order to 
mitigate the most damaging effects of a unitary EU-
wide patent.227 
Now the proposals are reaching the point of reality, that 
cynicism has been tempered on two accounts: by changes to the 
proposals and by a coming to terms with a reality.  This can be 
seen in the paper produced from the European Scrutiny Committee 
when it considered the position anew in February 2013.  While 
much of their concern has abated, they still conclude that questions 
remained to be resolved: 
8.27  We note the changes to the UPC Agreement 
since we published our Report, The Unified Patent 
Court: Help or Hindrance?, on 3 May last year.  
The most significant change is the removal of the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction over the infringement of unitary 
patents, which was a principal recommendation of 
our Report.228  We are also pleased to note that at 
least part of the Central Division will be located in 
London; that there is scope for extending the 
transitional provisions by a further seven years; and 
that Supplementary Protection Certificates will fall 
within the UPC’s jurisdiction. 
 
 
 227 HOUSE OF COMMONS EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE UNIFIED PATENT 
COURT: HELP OR HINDRANCE?, 2010–12, H.C. 1799-I, ¶ 186–87 (U.K.). 
 228 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
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8.28  However, many of the concerns with the UPC 
still remain, in particular the effect of bifurcation on 
forum shopping, the training and quality of UPC 
judges, the prohibitive expense of using the unitary 
patent and UPC, particularly for SMEs, and the lack 
of an up-to-date Commission impact assessment 
(we remain doubtful at this stage of the benefits to 
business suggested by the Minister in paragraph 
8.24 above). 
 
8.29 Given that the negotiations on the UPC 
Agreement have now concluded, we are content to 
clear it from scrutiny.  The Minister says, however, 
that: 
 
“Further negotiations among the signatories will 
also be necessary to finalise the rules of procedure 
for the court, to set the level of patent and court fees 
and establish the governance mechanisms for the 
court.  The Government will ensure that it continues 
to influence the operational details related to the 
Agreement and that the views of UK stakeholders 
are considered in the wider discussions.  
Separately, signatories will need to consider 
whether to establish local or regional divisions of 
the court.”[44] 
 
8.30  In the light of this, we would be grateful if the 
Minister would write to us at the conclusion of the 
negotiations on the rules of procedure summarising 
their content and explain to what extent they 
mitigate the outstanding concerns we list above, and 
to what extent they reflect the views of the 
stakeholders which the Government will be 
consulting.229 
 
 229 See UK Parliament House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 8 European 
Unitary Patent, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 
cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxx/8610.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
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CHANGING PRACTICE—THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, AND THE 
COMING DECADE 
Looking back over the last twenty years, the development in 
the law, and in particular the significance of the EPO, has been 
paralleled by the internationalization of the role of the practitioner. 
In the early 1990s, practice in the UK was emerging from a 
period of introspection.  We had been working over a decade or so 
to address recognised deficiencies in a system that was thought to 
be slow, expensive and overly rigid.  By the early 1990s, our 
patents courts had been through an overhaul.  They brought cases 
rapidly to trial, with experienced and respected judges, backed by a 
broad and able profession in London.  We had discovery confined 
to reasonable proportions, and a flexible court procedure under the 
parties’ control that gave real scrutiny to the issues, including those 
under cross-examination.  When we were preparing for trial, we 
were focused on prior art, on discovery, on expert reports, and on 
experiments, and then in trial we dealt with the issues through 
cross-examining witnesses.  That underpinning remains largely in 
place to this day, and arguably provided a blueprint that heavily 
influenced the broader overhaul of the UK civil justice system.  
The UK system has not been heavily influenced by the 
developments in e-discovery that have shaped procedural 
developments in the United States, principally because discovery 
in the UK has been so confined.  It is no longer a trawl, but a much 
more targeted and narrower exercise.  Email, social media, the 
incursion of private and social communications, and bring-your-
own-device into the workplace create new challenges for 
discovery.  However, the extent to which discovery has been 
confined in UK patents cases makes it likely that patent litigation 
will be following developments in discovery-heavy actions in other 
parts of civil justice rather than seeking to lead developments. 
Back in the early 1990s, UK practitioners were already in 
dialogue with our judges.  This feature of the system has grown 
and matured over the time.  Currently two judges (Floyd and 
Arnold JJ) hear most of the High Court cases at first instance with 
one further judge (HHJ Birss) hearing cases in the Patents County 
Court.  Appellate cases are mostly heard in a panel that includes 
Kitchin LJ, the former senior patents judge, and before that Jacob 
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LJ took the same role.  Lord Neuberger, well known for his interest 
in patents cases, has taken over a leading role from Lord Hoffmann 
in Supreme Court patent cases.  The cadre of judges hearing most 
of the cases is therefore small.  They are without exception well 
known to and well liked by the profession, which recognizes that 
they have all gone a long way to make themselves available and to 
listen to the views of practitioners on the development of practice 
and on points of concern.  This is not a new phenomenon.  It was 
the result of a movement given impetus by Mr. Justice Jacob when 
he was first appointed and enthusiastically pursued by his 
successors.  The role of the late Sir Hugh Laddie and Sir Nicholas 
Pumfrey in furthering the approachability of our judges should not 
be overlooked or underestimated.  As a result, over the last twenty 
years it has increasingly been the case that practice develops 
through a genuine dialogue between practitioners and the small 
group of judges before whom we practice most often. 
Twenty years ago, practitioners were beginning to take an 
interest in the law in other parts of Europe.  There were potential 
tools in other jurisdictions that could be useful in particular 
circumstances—the saisie contrafaçon in France (and Belgium) 
being a prime example.  Over the 1990s, we watched the 
development of torpedoes in Italy (and Belgium) but, it is fair to 
say, there was considerable doubt as to the wisdom of using those 
tactics in the context of a UK action.  It was well known that the 
UK judges may assume that a party that was trying to keep a case 
out of court had something to hide; that assumption would be 
given strength by such nefarious and transparent tactics as the 
torpedo actions.  There are enough implements in the UK judicial 
toolbox to address most matters of which the courts take a dim 
view and, consequently, this jurisdictional contrivance was not 
widely relied upon in UK cases.  In general, while torpedoes were 
in their heyday, UK professionals would advise clients on why 
what looked like a great tactic in theory was in fact not such a good 
idea in practice.  Thankfully, the tactic was rarely used.  When 
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torpedo actions came to an end with Roche v. Primus230 and GAT 
v. LuK,231 few mourned their passing. 
While procedural games like the torpedo have not played a 
huge part of UK practice, the same cannot be said about 
substantive judgments.  Most large patent cases that fight in the 
UK are also being fought in at least The Netherlands, Germany and 
perhaps France, Italy, the United States and elsewhere as well.  
Twenty years back, co-ordination of these actions was primarily 
(a) a matter of cost-saving by not duplicating work that had already 
been done and (b) a way to avoid the difficulties that arise from a 
witness being cross-examined against a backdrop of different 
testimony before various courts.  UK first instance judges used to 
pay little interest to findings in parallel litigation in other 
jurisdictions.  One judge is famously rumoured to have opened the 
folder “judgments of other jurisdictions” only after he had written 
his judgment, and even then only to check that the overseas court 
had come to the right decision.  Mandated by the House of Lords 
to defer to EPO decisions, and with the UK judges seeing more 
and more of their European brethren at judges’ conferences and 
elsewhere, the island mentality gradually eroded.  Practitioners 
started to read judgments from courts around Europe, to debate 
comparative law, to use those cases in court as persuasive 
authorities, and through this to promote the broader European 
patent order. 
While UK courts may initially have been reluctant to pay much 
regard to foreign judgments, if anything the opposite is now true.  
The clearest exposition of the position came in Grimme v. Derek 
Scott232 where the Court of Appeal heard a case without being told 
by either party that the same case had been the subject of a Dutch 
judgment.  Jacob LJ was unimpressed, saying: 
Following oral argument we undertook some legal 
research of our own and the opportunity of asking 
judicial colleagues in Germany and Holland as to 
whether they had any case law on the equivalent 
 
 230 Case C-539/03, Roche v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535. 
 231 Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509. 
 232 Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. KG v. Scott, [2011] F.S.R. 7. 
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provisions to s. 60(2).  Indeed they had (and an 
unreported case of Jacob J also emerged).  The 
Dutch Judge told us that his court had even 
considered the case of a man selling Mr Scott’s very 
machine.  We were astonished that the parties, 
particularly Grimme who were the Dutch plaintiffs, 
did not tell us about that case. 
 
Accordingly we sought further written argument on 
the point. 
 
Advocates should recognise that where a point of 
patent law of general importance, such as the 
construction of a provision which by Treaty (either 
the EPC or the Community Patent Convention) is to 
be implemented by states parties to those 
conventions, has been decided by a court, 
particularly a higher court, of another member state, 
the decision matters here.  For, despite the fact that 
there is no common ultimate patent court for 
Europe, it is of obvious importance to all the 
countries of the European Patent Union or the 
parties to the Community Patent Convention (“the 
CPC”), that as far as possible the same legal rules 
apply across all the countries where the provisions 
of the Conventions have been implemented.  An 
important decision in one member state may well be 
of strong persuasive value in all the others, 
particularly where the judgment contains clear 
reasoning on the point. 
 
Broadly we think the principle in our courts—and 
indeed that in the courts of other member states—
should be to try to follow the reasoning of an 
important decision in another country.  Only if the 
court of one state is convinced that the reasoning of 
a court in another member state is erroneous should 
it depart from a point that has been authoritatively 
decided there.  Increasingly that has become the 
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practice in a number of countries, particularly in the 
important patent countries of France, Germany, 
Holland and England and Wales.  Nowadays we 
refer to each other’s decisions with a frequency 
which would have been hardly imaginable even 
twenty years ago.  And we do try to be consistent 
where possible. 
 
The Judges of the patent courts of the various 
countries of Europe have thereby been able to create 
some degree of uniformity even though the 
European Commission and the politicians continue 
to struggle on the long, long road which one day 
will give Europe a common patent court.233 
It can seem at times that this direction—that the reasoning of a 
court in another member state is one the court should try to 
follow—leads to appellate courts giving more deference to the first 
instance (and even interlocutory) decisions of other member states 
than they give to the UK first instance decision under appeal.  It 
also means that the basis of decisions is examined and re-
examined, and the courts are increasingly alive to differentiated 
arguments.  What it has meant for practitioners is an ever-
increasing focus on the first decision in Europe, and thereafter on 
playing out the same arguments and decision for confirmation by a 
succession of other European courts.  The consequence is that 
practice genuinely has moved on to a European level.  It is no 
longer possible to run patent litigation in Europe wearing national 
blinders.  Strategic decisions have to be taken with an eye on how 
it will be played out around Europe.  Consistent argumentation is 
no longer a luxury but a necessity.234 
The race for consistency has consequences in practice.  The 
primary consequence has been an increasing pressure on 
timetables.  The knowledge that the first judgment will be the 
guiding one could lead courts either towards speeding trials up so 
 
 233 Id. at 215 [77–81]. 
 234 See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Johnson & Johnson Med. Ltd., [2011] E.C.C. 10, 190–91 
[59–62]. 
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as to be the primary decision maker for Europe, or slowing cases 
down so as to ease the process by having decisions to follow.  The 
UK court in general appears to favour the former camp, and 
practice here over the last twenty years has been characterised by 
trying to fit broadly the same amount of work into increasingly 
tight timetables.  That process has been assisted by the growth in 
instantaneous communications and working practices; in fact the 
only point of weakness in further acceleration appears to be the 
capacity of individuals to work beyond the first twenty-four hours 
of each day.  At the same time, the last decade in particular has 
seen a growing recognition that legal practice has to become more 
diverse and accessible.  The tensions are already growing between 
case timetables predicated on twenty-four-hour availability of all 
the lawyers involved on the one hand, and on the other new 
entrants to the profession with ambitions to combine practice with 
responsibilities and ambitions outside of their professional life. 
The UK system has particular difficulties in this regard.  The 
very flexible UK procedure means that many features of procedure 
can be the subject of judicial decisions and that in turn leads to 
many interim applications on short notice.  As European influence 
grows, and particularly as the Unified Patents Court becomes a 
reality, one can anticipate that interim applications are going to 
become far less frequent and flexibility less available.  While that 
may sound like a disadvantage, it could considerably reduce costs, 
encourage the planning that makes workloads more manageable 
for those with responsibilities outside of work, and avoid obstacles 
in bringing cases to trial on a planned pathway. 
A second consequence of a race to consistency as been to 
question over-engineered aspects of the existing systems.  The UK 
system is well equipped to handle large, complex cases but has for 
years been poorly adapted to the problems of small and medium 
sized enterprise (“SME”).  The proposals go back at least as far as 
the Committee chaired by Sir Derek Oulton in 1987, which led to 
the establishment of the Patents County Court (PCC) in 1990.  The 
court had a shaky start and by 1999 was hearing very few cases.  It 
was re-launched in 2001 with the appointment of HH Judge Fysh 
QC but concerns remained that there was little difference in 
practice between Patents County Court and High Court procedures.  
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Proposals for reform were published in July 2009 and adopted in 
2010, which also saw the appointment of a new judge, HHJ Birss 
QC.  The PCC now limits evidence, discovery, trial time and cost 
recovery, and is proving attractive to the SME audience for which 
it was intended.  And the result is perhaps more akin to practice 
elsewhere in Europe.  Twenty years ago, the advice practitioners 
gave to SMEs about patent litigation tended to be not to bring it, or 
(if advising a defendant) to find a way to give up as quickly as 
possible.  The Patents County Court has changed that.  One can 
anticipate that PCC business will continue to grow for the 
foreseeable future.  The change has great significance for the 
profession.  If volumes of PCC work continue to grow then the 
normal practitioner workload may change from one or a handful of 
giant cases to a large number of small cases—more in line with 
practice elsewhere in Europe.  As this is new work, it also could 
generate significant extra demand for litigation services, for which 
lawyers and patent attorneys are competing.  Whether the 
resources are sufficient to meet demand only time will tell.  The 
parallel operation of both a short and a full procedure in one 
jurisdiction helps identify the strengths and weaknesses of each 
and could, perhaps, provide useful information for the 
development of the practice and procedure of the Unified Patents 
Court—it is notable that the new court’s draft Rules set out, at the 
outset, that “complex cases may require more time and procedural 
steps and simple cases less time and less procedural steps.”235 
Twenty years ago, practitioners in the UK had little 
information about other cases.  While UK courts were in principle 
“open justice,” in practice interim applications were generally in 
private, and the only information publicly available was the writ.  
This has changed—a little.  Judgments are now generally available 
online quickly (usually through the excellent bailii.org site).  
Almost every court hearing in patent cases is now open to the 
public.  More documents are in principle available from the court 
file.  But it is very far from perfect.  Requests to the court office 
for copies of pleadings are slow, expensive, time consuming and 
 
 235 See Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of procedure of the Unified Patent 
Court at 15 (Preamble), available at http://www.upc.documents.eu.com/PDFs/2013-01-
31_Rules_of_Procedure_Draft_14 _(15829021_1).pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
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not always successful.  Many documents are only available after 
the considerable expense of an application and (brief) hearing.  
Truly open justice is still some distance away. 
Looking across the channel, UK practitioners appreciate that 
even the modest openness achieved over the last twenty years 
places the UK far ahead of the rest of Europe.  Without openness, 
it is difficult to make direct comparisons, hold parties to account 
for their statements to courts, and ensure courts are able to hear the 
full picture.  But any smugness about the UK system is rapidly 
dispelled on examining the U.S. approach.  PACER—while it is 
much derided in the United States—goes far beyond anything 
available in the UK.  It helps inform the U.S. system about its own 
functionality and provides the ready means to hold witnesses and 
parties to account.  It is notable that it provides a primary source of 
information for UK practitioners which our own systems cannot 
provide.  There are no plans to replicate PACER in the UK and no 
realistic hope that over the next ten years we will see similar 
openness here or indeed in any part of Europe.  This is a pity, 
because without the information that an open system breeds, one 
cannot see the needs for reform that undoubtedly exist and that 
would drive a better, more uniform and more functional European 
system.  When the Unified Patents Court comes into being it will, 
from the outset, have on-line inspection facilities for pleadings, 
evidence, decisions and orders.236  Perhaps that will encourage the 
UK to catch up. 
 
 
 236 See Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of procedure of the Unified Patent 
Court at 109 (Rule 262), available at http://www.upc.documents.eu.com/PDFs/2013-01-
31_Rules_of_Procedure_Draft_14_(15829021_1).pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
 
